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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the socio-economic determinants of four stages of 
borrowing process of the Jordanian microfinance market.  The equations and 
functions corresponding to the stages of the borrowing process are estimated 
using a sample of 474 microentrepreneurs.  The main results are as follow:  
variables that reflect the repayment ability are the main determinants of credit 
rationing in the microfinance market; religious beliefs, social responsibilities, 
availability of local microfinance providers, application costs, level of knowledge 
about microfinance providers significantly affect the borrowing process of 
microentrepreneurs. Credit rationing is found to be a problem for some 
applicants, but not for the majority. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many developing countries, mobilization of capital through financial 
intermediaries is still not fully developed.  Short-term loan (credit), rather 
than long-term loan (bonds) and equities (stocks), is their major source of 
capital mobilization.  Microentrepreneurs are mostly involved in short-term 
credit markets.  Because of potential default risk associated with credit 
contracts, lenders usually screen loan applications on the basis of borrowers’ 
intention and ability for repayment.  Loan contracts, therefore, need to 
include both price (interest rate) and non-price provisions (collateral, market 
interlinkage, etc.) as appropriate incentives for loan repayment (Tang, 1995).  
Lenders occasionally apply non-price rationing mechanisms based upon the 
attributes of the borrower and the business they finance.  However, 
distinguishing quantity rationed borrowers (those who have a positive 
demand at the ongoing contract terms) from price rationed individuals (those 
who have zero demand) is impossible without additional information.  
Because the microentrepreneurs have been found to be willing to pay higher 
interest rate 1 , question of price rationing in the micro finance sector is 
virtually non-existent.  Therefore, all microentrepreneurs basically face a 
binding supply constraint. Thus, the observed loan amount provides full 
information about the supply conditions.  
 
Quantity rationing may take the form of lenders offering an applicant a loan 
amount less than demanded or completely rejecting the loan demand. Unless 
further information is available, it is a difficult task to identify whether the 
market has cleared for a particular borrower or whether the supply is strictly 
less than demand or equal to zero.  To overcome the difficulty, one needs to 
collect information directly by designing a survey mechanism that permits 
                                                 
1 In a World Bank Report, Brandsma and Ghaouali (1998) state that ‘it is a myth that 
poor entrepreneurs are not bankable and cannot pay high interest rates, while the 
main constraint is the lack of access to finance, not the price of finance’. Similarly, 
Schreiner and Colombet (2001) also state that ‘the poor pay more for financial 
services because the poor cost more to serve.’ 
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full sample separation.  Under this type of survey mechanism, respondents 
are asked qualitative questions that are designed to identify both the supply as 
well as demand conditions and the rationing mechanism for each individual 
respondent.  This approach has been followed by Jappelli (1990), Zeller 
(1994), Baydas et al. (1994) and Crook (2001).  For example, Jappelli (1990) 
has estimated the determinants of a borrower being liquidity constrained and 
has used data in which constrained individuals are observable. Cross-
sectional data were used to assess the characteristics of credit-constrained 
households in the US economy by explicitly linking their existence to credit 
market imperfections and their personal characteristics.  The data, drawn 
from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), provides information on 
individuals whose request for credit had been rejected by financial 
intermediaries.  A logit model was developed in which both borrowers’ and 
lenders’ behaviours jointly determined the probability that a borrower was 
rationed in credit markets.  However, he excluded the partially rationed 
borrowers who obtained a loan amount less than their demand and also 
disregarded the determinants of applying for a loan and its size.  Later on, 
Zeller’s (1994) univariate probit model based on a household survey in 
Madagascar had included the determinants of applying for a loan and its size, 
although he failed to incorporate some major determinants of the borrowing 
process (demand and supply).  Using a randomly selected sample survey of 
participants in Ecuador’s micro enterprise programs in 1990, Baydas et al. 
(1994) have also incorporated some major determinants of credit rationing 
model, but they excluded all the partially rationed borrowers by assuming 
that their loan applications had been rejected.   
  
Like Jappelli (1990) and Zeller (1994), Crook (2001) analyzes the 
determinants of being credit constrained.  Using data for 1990-1995 from the 
latest version of the Survey of Consumer, he investigates the factors that 
affect a household being rejected or discouraged from applying for credit.  
Like Baydas et al. (1994), he incorporates some determinants of household's 
demand for credit.  A univariate probit model with standard error corrected 
for sampling weights is used to examine the determinants of being credit 
constrained, while a bivariate probit model followed by two stage least 
squares selection model was used to examine the demand for credit. 
 
It is noteworthy that all the above mentioned studies have ignored a 
frequently observed case of quantity rationing, that is, they have excluded the 
partially rationed borrowers who apply for a loan but obtain a loan amount 
less than their demand.  They also lack a thorough quantitative analysis of 
borrowers' behaviour before and after they make decision to enter credit 
markets. The present authors would like to rectify these shortcomings by 
providing a comprehensive analysis of the borrowing process of the 
microentrepreneurs in order to have a clear understanding of factors that 
affect the behaviour of both borrowers and lenders.  After dividing the 
borrowing process into four stages, we separate out the stage specific factors 
in the following order: factors that affect the probability of applying for credit, 
factors that affect demand for credit, factors that affect the probability of 
being rationed, and factors that affect the supply of credit for specific 
borrowers.  The present study also examines if additional non-economic 
variables such as religious beliefs, social events and associated social 
responsibilities do play an important role in the borrowing process of 
microentrepreneurs in an Islamic country like Jordan.   After introducing our 
model framework of the borrowing process in Section 2, we discuss our 
survey design and method in Section 3.  The econometric estimation methods 
involving four stages of the borrowing process and estimation results are 
presented in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively.  A conclusion is provided  
in the final section.  
 
2. Model framework to analyze the borrowing process 
 
An individual participates in credit markets as a borrower, when he or she has 
a demand for credit. The borrowing process consists of four sequential stages.  
At the first stage, an individual has to decide whether to apply for a loan or 
not. If the individual has a lack of demand for credit and therefore chooses 
not to apply for a loan, the borrowing process in relation to the individual 
does not arise.  But, if the individual chooses to apply for a loan at stage one, 
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he or she has to decide on the amount of the loan in stage two.  At stage three, 
the lender receives the loan application, assesses the creditworthiness of the 
applicant and then makes a decision whether to approve the loan or not.  
Depending on the lender's selection criteria and the creditworthiness of the 
applicant, the lender determines the maximum amount of loan in stage four.  
When the lender grants the borrower less than the loan demand, credit 
rationing arises.  The following models represent the different stages of the 
borrowing process. 
 
Stage One: An individual decides whether to apply for a loan or not 
 
Function (1) relates the determinants to the probability of an individual 
applying for a loan:   
 
Prob (APPLY) = F (I, H, R, O)    (1) 
 
where: 
 
APPLY : dummy (1 if the individual applies, 0 otherwise). 
I  : vector of individual applicant's characteristics that affect the 
decision whether to apply for a loan or not; 
H  : vector of household’s characteristics that affect the 
individual's decision; 
R : repayment ability variables; and 
O : vector of other variables that affect the individual's decision. 
 
 
Stage Two: Applicants are required to determine their loan demands 
 
Equation (2) is a loan demand equation of those who have applied for loans 
in stage one:  
 
LD = β1X1 + α1r + u1      (2) 
 
where:  
 
LD : loan demand; 
r : interest rate; 
X1  : vector of explanatory variables; and 
u1   : random disturbance assumed to be independent of X1. 
 
Stage Three: The lender decides whether to approve the loan demand or 
not 
 
Function (3) relates the determinants to the probability that an applicant’s 
loan demand will be rationed by a lender: 
Prob (RATIONED) = F (I, H, R, O)    (3) 
 
where: 
 
RATIONED : dummy (1 if applicant's loan demand was rationed, 0 
otherwise) 
I : vector of applicant's characteristics that affect the lender's 
decision; 
H : vector of household’s characteristics that affect the lender's 
decision; 
R : repayment ability variables; and 
O : vector of other variables that affect the lender's decision. 
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Stage Four: The lender determines the maximum amount that can be 
granted to the creditworthy borrowers 
 
Equation (4) is a loan supply equation indicating the maximum amount that 
the lender is willing to lend given the state of knowledge about the applicant. 
    
LS = β2X2 + α2r + u2      (4) 
 
where: 
 
LS : the maximum amount that the lender is willing to lend given the 
state 
 of knowledge about the applicant; 
r : interest rate; 
: vector of explanatory variables; and 
u2 : random disturbance assumed to be independent of X2. 
 
The above equations and functions are to be estimated using survey data 
collected at the regional levels of Jordan. 
 
3. The survey 
 
Surveys carried out in Jordan often have samples designed for representatives 
at the regional levels (North, Central and South) rather than the sub-regional 
or governorate levels.  Mostly, closed questions method has been adopted in 
the questionnaire; some open-ended questions have also been used in order to 
explore additional information. The questionnaire has been relatively simple 
in order to suit the educational levels of the respondents.  The total number of 
completed questionnaires received by the authors was 682 (90.9 percent), out 
of which 474 responses (63.2 percent) have been used for analysis.  As Table 
1 below shows, the response rate is highest in the Central region (92 percent), 
followed by the Northern region (89.9 percent) and the Southern region (87.3 
percent). However, the percentage of usable responses has been highest in the 
Southern region.  
 
Table (1) 
 
Response Rates of the Sample 
 
 
Region Northern Central Southern 
Number of questionnaires distributed 207 472 71 
Number of replies received  186 434 62 
Response rate (percent) 89.9 92 87.3 
Usable responses  165 249 60 
Percentage of usable responses 
(percent) 
79.7 52.75 84.5 
 
3.1 Respondents' Socio-economic Characteristics 
 
The age distribution of the sample shows that the respondents’ ages range 
between 18 and 71 years with the average being 31 years.  Approximately 99 
percent were among the labour force age group of (15-64) years and 67.9 
percent (332 out of 474) are less than the average (31 years).  The gender 
composition of the sample includes more men (60.5 percent) than women 
(39.5 percent).  The sex ratio of the sample (1.53) is higher than the 
countrywide ratio of (1.1) which reflects the predominance of men in the 
labour force and credit markets.  Data on marital status shows that 53.2 
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percent are single and 46.8 percent are married.2 About 43.7 percent of the 
respondents own their houses, while 23.2 percent live in rented houses and 
33.1 percent live in the family house.  None of the respondents is illiterates. 
Their educational level is fairly high: more than half of them have completed 
bachelor degree.  Of the remainder, approximately 3.2 percent, 9.3 percent, 
20 percent, and 14.3 percent have respectively completed preparatory school, 
secondary school, diploma and post graduate degree.  It is interesting to note 
that the proportion of men in all educational levels is higher than women 
except in the diploma and university degrees.  Data on the respondent’s 
working status shows that 61 percent of respondents have full time jobs and 
the remainder are unemployed at the time of survey.  Among those with full 
time jobs, about 38.4 percent (111 out of 289) work in the public sector, 43.3 
percent work in the private sector and the rest work in their own businesses.  
The gender composition of the unemployed respondents shows that 31.9 
percent (59 out of 185) are male and 68.1 percent (126 out of 185) are female.  
About 48.3 percent of the respondents report that they are head of the 
household.  This percentage exceeds the percentage of married respondents 
which indicates that some of the single respondents are the main providers for 
their families. As expected, 60.6 percent of the men (174 out of 287) are 
heads of the household and main providers of the family compared with only 
29.4 percent of the women (55 out of 185).  The respondents’ monthly 
income range from JD25 to JD1100, about 55 percent (261 out of 474) report 
earning less than the average of JD232. On the other hand, the respondents’ 
monthly expenditures range from JD20 to JD976 with an average of JD236. 
These figures indicate that 57 percent spend less than the average, 61.6 
percent spend more than their income and only 19.8 percent save an average 
of less than JD100 per month.  Among six different major networks of credit 
sources available to the respondents, the informal sources are the most 
preferable followed by the microfinance providers (Table 2).  About 20 
percent of respondents report that they have no need for credit.  
 
                                                 
2 The questionnaire did not include “divorced” as an option along with the martial 
status options because being divorced is socially unacceptable and a sensitive issue. 
Table 2 
 
Preferable Sources of Credit 
 
Sources of Credit (1 if Yes, 0 otherwise) Percentage  
Informal Sources (Friends, Relatives, Shopkeepers .etc) 0.44 
Microfinance Providers 0.43 
Cash and Returned Earnings 0.26 
Bank Loans 0.22 
Rotating Savings 0.22 
None of the above ( I do not need any Funding) 0.2 
Others 0.02 
 
3.2 Respondents' Borrowing Behaviour in Microfinance Market 
 
The questionnaire has been prepared to investigate the respondents’ 
knowledge of microfinance providers (governmental and non-governmental) 
and how religious beliefs and social responsibilities affect their borrowing 
behaviour.  As a measure of respondents’ knowledge of the microfinance 
providers, we have decided to select those who have reported that they knew 
more than 10 out of 20 nominated microfinance providers3.  About 26.8 
                                                 
3 The Development and Employment Fund (DEF) was the most familiar institution, 
followed by the Agriculture Credit Corporation (ACC). The National Aid Fund 
(NAF) and the Vocational Training Organization (VTO) took equal third position. 
Interestingly, it was reported that the private microfinance providers- Microfund for 
Women (MFW), Jordan Microcredit Company (JMCC), Al Ahli Microfinancing 
Company (AMC), and Jordan Access to Credit Project (JACC)- and the international 
organizations - Near East Foundation (NEF) Save the Children Federation (SC), 
Cooperation for Development (CD) - were among the less familiar microfinance 
providers.  The rest of the providers include General Union of Voluntary Societies 
(GUVS), Industrial Development Bank (IDB), Noor Al Hussein Foundation (NHF), 
Jordanian Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC), Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation (HUDC), Orphans Fund (OF), Jordanian Hashemite Fund (JOUHD), 
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percent (127 out of 474) reported that they knew about more than 10 of these 
providers.  Barriers facing microentrepreneurs obtaining credit are reported.  
Religious beliefs are the most frequent barrier, followed by lack of 
information on alternative sources of credit, and lack of experience in 
establishing micro enterprises (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
 
Respondents Facing Barriers in Obtaining Credit 
 
Barriers (1 if Yes, 0 otherwise) Percentage  
Religious barriers 0.67 
Lack of information about sources of funding 0.61 
Lack of experience in establishing micro enterprises 0.59 
Lack of experience in running a business 0.49 
Legal obstacles 0.42 
Social barriers 0.27 
Other barriers 0.05 
 
As to the demand for micro credit, about 45.6 percent of the total samples 
have applied for a loan from one or more of the microfinance providers.  The 
number of applications range from one to three applications: about 75 percent 
for one loan, 18.5 percent for two loans, and the remainder for three loans.  
About 58.8 percent of all applicants obtained one loan approval, 12 percent 
obtained two loan approvals, while 28.2 percent did not receive any loan 
approvals.  Interestingly, about 66 percent of the total sample report that 
Islamic beliefs affect their willingness to apply for a loan from a 
microfinance provider. Moreover, application fees (78.9 percent) and social 
events and responsibilities (49.2 percent) are reported as factors affecting the 
respondents' borrowing behaviour in the microfinance market.  About 46.6 
percent of the total sample report having at least one local microfinance 
                                                                                                                    
Jordan Cooperation Organization (JCO), Social Security Net (SSN), and Queen Alia 
Fun (QAF). 
provider. The availability of any of these providers in local seems to increase 
the willingness of 31.4 percent of respondents to apply for micro credit.  In 
relation to the most recent loan application, the loan amounts that have been 
requested ranges from JD500 to JD10000. Only 12 percent of the applicants 
have requested less than JD1000, 57.9 percent have requested between 
JD1000 and JD3000, and the rest have requested more than JD3000.  Despite 
the fact that all applicants have expected loan approvals, only 63.9 percent of 
the applications have been approved.  About 58 percent (80 out of 138) have 
received the exact amount requested, 42 percent have been partially rationed 
(received less than loan demand), and 36.1 percent have been rejected.  The 
loan amount approved ranges from JD500 to JD5000 with an average of 
JD2185 at an average interest rate.  These loans have been granted for a 
period ranging from one to at most eight years of six percent.  More than half 
of the borrowers (52.3 percent) have been granted more than four years to 
repay their loans.  Moreover, 61.6 percent have been granted a grace period 
which ranges from three to 24 months.  Purposes of the loan differ between 
respondents. About 51.4 percent of the borrowers (71 out of 138) report using 
part of the loan for production activities, 12.3 percent for social events, 4.3 
percent for health expenses, 14.5 percent for consumption needs, 4.3 percent 
for educational needs, 26.1 percent for the repayment of  other loans, and 
63.8 percent for establishing new microenterprises. 
 
As expected, 99.1 percent (214 out of 216) of the loans were secured against 
some kind of collateral with values ranging from JD1000 and JD20000 and 
exceeding the loan amounts requested. Many respondents report securing 
their loan by financial collateral such as a bank account and salary (48.1 
percent), guarantors (31 percent), physical collateral (17.6 percent), 
machinery (0.9 percent) and business licence (7.4 percent).  Finally, those 
who did not apply for any loans from microfinance providers report many 
reasons in descending order (Table 4). 
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Table 4 
 
Reason for Not Applying for Micro Credit  
 
Reasons for Applying for Micro Credit  (1 if Yes, 0 
otherwise) 
Percentage  
I prefer to borrow from informal sources 0.77 
Lack of collateral  0.68 
Lack of minimal equity 0.51 
Lack of demand for credit 0.44 
Social barriers 0.38 
Difficult loan conditions 0.33 
Bad credit history 0.27 
Lack of spouse approval 0.21 
Religious barriers 0.21 
I prefer to borrow from a bank  0.09 
Lack of information about these institutions 0.04 
High interest rate 0.02 
 
4. The estimation methods 
 
The dependent variables in function (1) and function (3) are binary variables 
that take zero-one value, while those in equation (2) and equation (4) are 
quantitative variables. Accordingly, methods of estimation of the two groups 
of equations are different as shown below. 
 
4.1 Binary dependent variables: PROBIT models 
 
Estimating choice models using the usual least squares estimation method is 
not the best choice. One problem with the Linear Probability Model (LPM) is 
that the error is heteroskedastic––variance of the error term varies from one 
observation to another. Moreover, the least squares method yields unreliable 
values of probability, less than zero or more than one, due to the assumption 
of linearity between the probability and the explanatory variables.   
 
The probability that an event occurs is non-linear and hence can be estimated 
by a method called PROBIT.4 The PROBIT specifications are designed to 
analyze the qualitative data reflecting a choice between two alternatives. It 
provides a way of qualifying the relationship between the individual 
characteristics in addition to other explanatory variables and the probability 
of choosing an alternative.  Estimating the PROBIT model is performed by 
maximizing the likelihood function with respect to all coefficients. The 
maximization requires an iterative method, but in most cases the algorithm 
will operate smoothly, because the PROBIT model likelihood function is very 
well behaved (Hill et al., 2001). The EVIEWS software package is used to 
estimate the PROBIT models of functions (1) and (3) under stage 1 and stage 
3 respectively.  
 
4.2 Sample selection bias: Heckit method  
 
In equation (2) the dependent variable related to stage 2, LD, is observed 
only for those who have applied for loans for micro credit at stage 1 of the 
borrowing process, while it is not observable for those who have decided not 
to apply. In equation (4) related to stage 4, lenders select borrowers according 
to the following rule: 
 
 LS   if   LS ≥ LD                     Creditworthy borrowers 
LR =  LS   if   LS  < LD, LS ≠ 0       Partially rationed applicants                    
 0                                              Rejected applicants 
 
where LR is the observed loan granted. Applicants under the condition of LS 
≥ LD fall into the creditworthy borrowers subgroup, while applicants under 
                                                 
4 An alternative to the PROBIT model for binary choices is the LOGIT model. These 
models differ only in the particular S-shaped curve used to constrain probability to 
the (0,1) interval.  
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the conditions of LS < LD and LS = 0 fall into the partially rationed 
applicants subgroup and fully rejected subgroup respectively.  For estimation 
purpose, one may tend to ignore the respondents who have decided not to 
apply for loans in stage 1, and then use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method to estimate equation (2) and the TOBIT method5 to estimate equation 
(4).  But this approach is not workable because the sub-sample (individuals 
who applied for loans or who have been rationed by lenders) is not random 
and the observed data are selected by a systematic process, and, therefore 
results are biased.  James Heckman (1979) analyzes the selection bias 
problem that results from using non-randomly selected samples when 
estimating a behavioural relationship.  In order to overcome this bias problem, 
he suggests for an alternative estimation method, which has been known as 
Heckit method.  Following this method, two steps estimation has been 
conducted for each of the two behavioural equations (2) and (4).  
 
Step I: Estimate the PROBIT model of decision equation or selection 
equation by maximum likelihood estimation method. For each 
observation in the selected sample, calculate and save the value of the 
Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR). 
 
Step II: Using the selected sample, regress the dependent variable 
on the nominated explanatory variables and the Inverse Mill's Ratio. 
The Inverse Mills Ratio is created from the first step PROBIT 
estimation and accounts for the fact that the observed sample is not 
random. 
 
In case of equation (2), firstly, the Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR) of all 
observations in the selected sample of individuals who have applied for loans 
are calculated from the PROBIT model in function (1) and secondly, OLS 
estimation is used to regress LD on its explanatory variables and IMR.   
 
                                                 
5 The TOBIT method is fully described in Tobin (1958, pp 24-30).   
 
In case of equation (4), firstly, the Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR) of all 
observations in the selected sample of individuals who been rationed are 
calculated from the PROBIT model in function (3) and secondly, MLE 
estimation is used to regress LS on its explanatory variables and IMR. 
 
5.  The estimation results 
 
In this section, socio-economic explanatory variables, which reflect the 
personal characteristics, household characteristics, repayment ability of 
microentrepreneurs, and many other variables that affect lender's and 
borrower's decisions, are examined for their effect on the borrowing process 
of microentrepreneurs. Definitions of such variables, which have been used in 
this section, are shown in Appendix-I.     
 
5.1 Determinants of Applications for Loans (Stage One): PROBIT Model 
 
Function (1) relates the explanatory variables to the probability of applying 
for micro credit.  The explanatory variables that affect the individual's 
decision include individual’s characteristics, the household's characteristics, 
repayment ability variables that reflect the individual's ability to secure a loan, 
and other factors affecting the individual's decision such as having social 
events and responsibilities, religious beliefs, application cost, availability of a 
lender in local, availability of a mediator, and whether the individual has 
effective loans. 
 
The results of the first stage PROBIT model, which determine the factors that 
affect the probability of applying for micro credit, are shown in Appendix-II.  
It shows that the following variables significantly negatively affect the 
probability of applying for micro credit (at least at the 5% level). Firstly, 
employed and male individuals are less likely to apply for micro credit than 
unemployed and female individuals. This may reflect the males' ability for 
self-financing or the ability to access other credit markets or lack of demand 
for micro credit. Females always have less family responsibilities than males 
and face social barriers in accessing other credit markets. Some times, 
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females become less likely to apply for micro credit when they find 
themselves out of the target groups of the microfinance providers.  Secondly, 
the use of micro credit to finance social events and responsibilities is low, 
which decreases the probability of applying for micro credit to finance such 
events. Individuals perceive no chance of loan approval for such purposes.  
Thirdly, as application cost increases, the probability of applying for micro 
credit decreases. This may indicate that application cost is an important 
component in making borrowing decisions especially when the individual 
fears loan rejection.  Fourthly, the probability of applying for micro credit 
decreases when the microfinance providers are non-Islamic institutions. 
Some of these providers have borrowing schemes that take the prohibition of 
interest rate "usury" into consideration in order to attract religious borrowers.  
Fifthly, as the value of a household's monetary saving increases, the 
probability of applying for micro credit decreases. Monetary savings of the 
household members may work as a substitute for borrowing from external 
sources specially when all household members live in the family house and 
keep strong relations between themselves.  Lastly, the coefficient of the 
dummy variable that represents the availability of a guarantor is negative. 
This type of collateral is not useful specially when the guarantor has no credit 
history or guarantees other borrowers at the same time. The availability of a 
guarantor may be more useful in other credit markets.  
 
On the other hand, the following variables have a significant positive effect 
(at least at the 10% level) on the probability of applying for micro credit. 
Firstly, being single and having a tendency for being financially independent 
from family implies more willingness to obtain self-employment loans. This 
increases the probability of applying for micro credit.  Secondly, the head of 
the household bears the major proportion of the family expenses which 
reflects additional demand for credit. This reflects the positive sign of the 
coefficient of the dummy variable that represents being the head of household.  
Thirdly, having enough knowledge about sources of credit such as banks, 
microfinance providers and informal lenders, may increase the probability of 
applying for micro credit if the individual considers microfinance providers 
as a favourable source of credit from social and religious perspectives. 
Individuals are more likely to favour borrowing from microfinance providers 
when they find themselves among the target group of these institutions. 
Fourthly, availability of a microfinance provider in local increases the 
probability of applying for micro credit from this institution. This may reduce 
the application cost and waiting period for the lender's decision. Fifthly, 
having an effective loan increases the probability of applying for a new loan 
to repay other loans or to expand existing businesses. Having more than one 
loan may indicate good relations with lenders and eligibility.   
 
Increasing age within the (18-24) and the (35-44) age groups increases the 
probability of applying for micro credit, while the probability decreases as the 
age increases within the (45-54) age group. This reflects the lender's 
requirements in relation to age. Some microfinance providers focus on 
specific age groups or have an age ceiling. If the age of the individual 
exceeds that of the age ceiling, he or she perceives no chance of loan 
approval which makes him or her less likely to apply. Years of formal 
education, whether the individual owns his or her house, the size of the 
household, having real estate collateral, availability of a mediator, and the 
size of net total cash flow are found to have no significant affect the 
probability of applying for micro credit.  
 
5.2 Determinants of Demand for Micro Credit (Stage Two): Heckit Method 
 
Equation (2) is the loan demand equation. The interest rate is included to 
measure price elasticity.  The value of the loans received by the applicant 
from banks and informal lenders measures the degree of complementarity and 
substitutability between different sources of credit. The value of assets and 
whether the applicant expects social events and responsibilities measures the 
need for liquidity. Whether the applicant has minimal equity or not indicates 
the ability to self-finance. The value of collateral available to secure the loan 
reflects the applicant's ability to repay the loan and keep a good credit record. 
The region and sector dummy variables are used to examine demand for 
micro credit in different regions and sectors. Years of formal education 
reflect the experience and management capability of the applicant. Personal 
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characteristics reflect the type of the applicant such as: age, sex, martial status, 
whether the applicant owns his or her house and being a head of the 
household.  The Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR) is used as an additional regressor. 
It is calculated for each observation of the selected sample (those who applied 
for loans) from the first stage PROBIT model (function 1). If the coefficient 
of the IMR is found to significant, sample selection bias is really exists and 
including IMR as an additional regressor is relevant and increases efficiency. 
In the contrary, insignificant effect of Inverse Mill's Ratio indicates no 
sample selection bias is detected 
 
The results of the second stage which analyzes  the determinants of demand 
for micro credit, are shown in Appendix-III. Borrowers who previously 
received bank loans tend to demand larger amounts of micro credit.  This 
indicates a complementary relationship between bank loans and micro credit 
from microfinance providers. This may reflect the need for large amounts of 
credit that are not available from one source or the need for diversification.  
An unexpected result of positive but insignificant coefficient of interest rate 
is found. This may indicate that the interest rate has been almost negative in 
real terms, so the nominal interest rate may not affect demand for micro 
credit. Interest rates on micro credit are characterized by being subsidized 
interest rates.  When borrowing from microfinance providers, 
microentrepreneurs pay little attention to the interest rate especially when no 
other sources of fund are available.  The coefficients of assets and value of 
collateral are positive and significantly related to demand for micro credit. 
The value of assets as a proxy for the size of business implies high demand 
for larger enterprises and the value of collateral is a proxy for the ability to 
secure larger loans.  Such variables increase the individual's expectations of 
receiving larger loans may increase the risk taking attitude of the individual 
by increasing borrowing.  Borrowers with larger minimal equity usually 
demand larger micro credit. This may reflect the high cost of the project 
financed by the loan or indicates greater risk taking attitudes by borrowing a 
larger amount.  Results show that no significant difference between demands 
for micro credit in different regions is found. Applicants operating in the 
service sector demand smaller loans than those who operate in other sectors 
and those who operate in the agricultural sector, in particular, demands larger 
loans. Social events and responsibilities increase the demand for micro credit. 
Sometimes applicants aim at financing social events and responsibilities by 
micro credit; this may reflect the significant and positive coefficient of the 
dummy variable that represents the need of credit for social reasons. The 
applicants who own their houses demand smaller loans compared to those 
who live with family or in rented houses.  Those who head their households, 
those who are highly educated and single applicants demand larger loans. The 
coefficients of the age and the gender of the applicant are insignificant, but 
they may suggest that older and male borrowers demand smaller loans.  The 
coefficient of Inverse Mill's Ratio in the demand equation is positive but 
insignificant which may indicate that no sample selection bias really exists in 
this case. The sign of the coefficient indicates that those are more likely to 
apply for micro credit in stage one of the borrower process tend to demand 
larger loans in stage two of the borrowing process. 
 
5.3 Determinants of Being Credit Constrained (Stage Three): PROBIT Model        
 
Function (3) relates the explanatory variables to the probability that a lender 
will ration an applicant's loan demand. As in section 6.1, the explanatory 
variables that affect the lender's decision include the individual’s 
characteristics, household's characteristics, repayment ability variables, and 
other factors affecting the lender's decision. 
 
The results of the third stage which analyzes the determinants of being credit 
constraint are shown in Appendix-IV. Here variables that indicate how the 
repayment ability of the applicant significantly affects the lender's decision 
are discussed. Microfinance providers frequently ration applicants with larger 
leverage of bank and microfinance debt because leverage of debt affects the 
applicant's commitment toward new loans and may increase default risk. 
Microfinance providers are also more likely to ration applicants with larger 
dependency ratios for the same reason. Applicants who experienced a larger 
number of rejected loan applications in the past are more likely to be rationed 
in their current loan demand. Leverage of informal debt has no effect on the 
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MFI decision. Informal loans usually are of short maturity and disbursed in 
small amounts.  According to expectations, as the value of collateral and the 
value of household monetary savings increases, the probability of being 
rationed decreases. These variables indicate the applicant's ability to secure 
loans and reduce risk. The negative sign of the dummy variable that 
represents the ownership of a place of residency confirm the major role of 
collateral on the lender's decision. The house that the individual owns can be 
used as collateral. Since most of the microfinance providers mainly grant 
loans to income generating activities and self-employment projects, loan 
demand to finance social activities and responsibilities is more frequently 
rationed. But some applicants may mislead the institution about the purpose 
of loans. This may explain the positive sign of the dummy that represents the 
purpose of loans.  Agricultural loans are more likely to be rationed especially 
by non-agricultural oriented institutions. There is only one institution - 
Agriculture Credit Corporation (ACC) that specializes in agricultural finance. 
Ineligible applicants who seek agricultural loans in other institutions may be 
eligible in this institution.  Loan demands of older applicants are less 
frequently rationed, but at an increasing rate. Most of the borrowers are of 
moderate age. Older and younger individuals borrow relatively little due to 
age requirements. Heads of households and applicants with higher 
dependency ratios are more likely to be rationed; this result may be 
inconsistent with the coefficient of age.  Microfinance providers seem to 
reject any role for mediators; hence they always ration loan demand when 
mediators intervene in the borrowing process. Borrowers in the northern 
region are more likely to be rationed; this may reflect the fact that they 
frequently apply for micro credit or be due to the high population density in 
this region and the variety of institutions operating in this region.  Personal 
characteristics of an applicant such as sex, years of formal education, marital 
status, work status are found to have no significant effect on the lender's 
decision in stage three. 
 
5.4 Determinants of Supply of Credit (Stage Four): Heckit Method 
Equation (4) is the loan supply equation. It estimates the factors affecting the 
maximum amount that the lender is willing to lend given the state of 
knowledge about the applicant and according to its client selection criteria. 
The interest rate is included to measure the price elasticity, whether the 
applicant has effective bank and informal loans to measure ability to repay 
new loans,  maturity of loans to test the preference of lenders for maturity 
periods, the value of total assets and the value of collateral to reflect the 
applicant’s ability to secure the loan and liquidate to meet the loan 
repayments, region and sector variables to reflect the lender's preferences 
between different regions and sectors according to risk, years of experience to 
reflect the applicant's rationality and management capability, whether the 
applicant has minimal equity to reflect his or her seriousness, whether the 
applicant has social events and responsibilities to reflect the purpose of the 
loan and the expected returns of the loan, and other factors and personal 
characteristics to reflect the type of applicant such as age, sex, whether the 
applicant owns his or her house, years of formal education, dependency ratio, 
and being a head of the household.  
 
In order to correct for sample selection bias that may result from excluding 
those who didn't apply for loans, the IMR is used as an additional regressor in 
the loan supply equation (equation 4). The IMR is calculated for each 
observation of the selected sample (those who applied for loans). If the 
coefficient of the IMR is found to be significant, sample selection bias is 
really exists and including the IMR as an additional regressor is relevant and 
increases efficiency. In the contrary, insignificant effect of IMR indicates no 
sample selection bias is detected. A negative sign of the coefficient of IMR in 
the loan supply equation (equation 4) indicates that lenders grant smaller loan 
amounts to those who are found to be more likely to be rationed.  
 
The results of the fourth stage which analyzes the determinants of the 
maximum amount a microfinance provider is willing to lend given the state 
of knowledge about the borrower, are shown in Appendix-V. As expected, the 
interest rate coefficient is positive and significant indicating that 
microfinance providers are willing to supply larger loans at higher interest 
rates. Microfinance providers are more inclined to favour the disbursement of 
longer maturity loans; this may reflect the attempt to reduce transaction costs 
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and the social objectives of these providers.  Microfinance providers lend 
larger amounts to applicants who have a larger value of assets and collateral 
since they demand larger loans as shown in stage two of the borrowing 
process. They also disburse larger loans for borrowers who have effective 
loans since they demand larger loans.  Microfinance providers lend larger 
amounts to those with extensive experience in business because years of 
experience reflect management capability, rationality and reduce the business 
failure risk.  They also tend to grant larger loans to applicants with higher 
minimal equity because it indicates more seriousness.  Sector of operation 
and region have no significant effect on micro credit disbursed since each 
lender has its own target group and target sector. This indicates that a large 
number of institutions specialize in specific regions and development of 
specific sectors.  Older borrowers receive larger amounts of micro credit but 
at a decreasing rate. MFI loans to those who head their households and who 
own their houses are smaller than to their counterparts. Other personal 
characteristic variables such as gender, years of formal education and 
dependency ratio have no significant effect on the amount disbursed. Using a 
loan for social purpose doesn't affect the loan granted by a lender to a specific 
borrower, especially if that loan is highly secured by collateral. The 
coefficient of IMR in the supply equation in the microfinance market is 
positive but insignificant which may indicate that no sample selection bias 
really exists in this case. The sign of the coefficient is questionable since it 
shows that microfinance providers grant larger loans in stage four to those 
who are more likely to be rationed in stage two. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The socio-economic determinants of the borrowers' and lenders' behaviours 
in four stages of the borrowing process have been examined.  Those who are 
single microentrepreneurs, those who head their households, those who are 
familiar with larger numbers of the microfinance providers, those who have 
local microfinance provider, those who currently have effective loans, and 
those whose age is increasing in the (18-24) and the (35-44) age groups have 
been found to be more likely to apply for micro credit from a microfinance 
provider.  Those who are male microentrepreneurs, those who have strong 
religious beliefs, those who work in full time jobs, those with higher 
household monetary savings, those who have a guarantor, those who have 
social responsibilities, those who refuse the higher application cost, and those 
who are in the (45-54) age group have been found to be less likely to apply 
for micro credit.  Those who have received larger bank loans, those who have 
more assets, those who possess higher value of collateral, those who have 
minimal equity, those who have social events and responsibilities, those who 
operate in the agricultural sector, those who have higher formal education, 
those who head their households, and those who are single applicants tend to 
demand larger amounts of micro credit. Those who own their place of 
residency tend to demand smaller amount of micro credit.  Those who are 
single applicants, those who head their households, those who have more 
collateral, those who have social responsibilities, and those who have 
effective loans are more likely to apply for micro credit and tend to demand 
larger loans when they choose to apply. 
 
The microfinance providers consider the value of collateral and monetary 
savings as criteria for rationing credit. Those who head their households, 
those who are located in the northern region, those with higher dependency 
ratio, those with larger leverage of debt, those with larger number of rejected 
applications in the past, those who have social responsibilities, those who 
apply for productive loans, and those who have a mediator are more likely to 
be rationed by the microfinance providers. On the other hand, those who are 
older applicants, those who own their place of residency, those with higher 
value of collateral, and those with higher value of monetary savings are less 
likely to be rationed by the microfinance providers.  Heads of households and 
those who have social responsibilities are more likely to be rationed by the 
microfinance providers not because lenders discriminate against such groups 
but because they more often apply for micro credit. On the other hand, those 
who have higher values of monetary savings tend to apply less frequently for 
micro credit and thus are less likely to be rationed. 
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The microfinance providers grant larger loans to those who are willing to pay 
higher interest rates, those who have more assets, higher value of collateral, 
minimal equity, effective loans, and more experience.  The older applicants 
receive larger loans but loans amount become smaller and smaller as their age 
increases more and more6.  The microfinance providers tend to grant larger 
loans to those who have received bank loans in the past, those who have more 
assets and collateral and those who have minimal equity; this is because they 
tend to demand larger loans than their counterparts. Those who own their 
houses receive smaller loans because they demand smaller loans. Although 
social events and responsibilities result in an increase in the demand for 
micro credit, but these may not affect the amount granted by microfinance 
providers. 
 
The most interesting result that we obtain confirms our conjecture that the 
non-economic factors like religious belief, social events and associated social 
responsibilities do play very significant role, specifically in the demand side 
of the borrowing process, in an Islamic country like Jordan. 
                                                 
6 The minimum and maximum eligible age requirements for loan application very 
often differ among the microfinance providers. 
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APPENDIX–I 
 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
AGE : Age of individual; 
AGESQ : Age squared; 
AGRI : Sector of operation dummy variable (1 if agriculture sector, 0 otherwise); 
AOLENDER : Dummy (1 if there is a lender in local, 0 otherwise); 
APPCOST : Dummy (1 if application cost affects the borrower's decision, 0 otherwise); 
APPREJ : Number of rejected loan applications in the past;  
ASSETS : Value of assets owned by the individual; 
BANKLOAN : Amount of bank loan received by the individual; 
CREGION : Dummy (1 if applicant lives in the central region, 0 otherwise); 
DEP : Dependency ratio;   
EFFLOAN : Dummy (1 if individual has effective loans, 0 otherwise); 
GCOLL : Dummy (1 if individual has guarantor, 0 otherwise); 
HOH : Dummy (1 if individual is the head the household, 0 otherwise); 
HVOMS : Value of monetary savings owned by household (JDs); 
IMR : Inverse Mill's Ratio; 
INF LOAN : Amount of informal loans received by the individual; 
IR : Interest rate; 
KNOW   : Knowledge Dummy variable (1 if individual has enough knowledge, 0 
otherwise); 
LEVERFORMAL : Leverage of bank debt; 
LEVERINFORM
AL 
: Leverage of informal debt; 
LEVERMFIS : Leverage of microfinance providers' debt (micro credit); 
MAT : Loan maturity; 
ME : Dummy (1 if individual has minimal equity, 0 otherwise); 
MEDIATOR : Dummy (1 if applicant used mediator, 0 otherwise); 
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MFILOAN : Amount of micro credit received by the individual; 
MSTATUS : Marital status  dummy variable (1 if single, 0 married); 
NREGION : Region dummy variable (1 if applicant lives in the northern region, 0 
otherwise); 
NTCFLOW  : Net total cash flow (earnings-expenses) in JDs; 
RECOLL : Dummy(1 if individual has real estate collateral, 0 otherwise); 
POLOAN : Purpose of loan dummy variable (1 if it used for productive purposes, 0 
otherwise); 
POR : House ownership dummy variable (1 if individual owns his house, 0 
otherwise); 
RBS : Religious beliefs dummy variable (1 if individual considers Islamic rules, 0 
otherwise); 
SER : Sector of operation dummy variable (1 if service sector, 0 otherwise); 
SEX : Gender dummy variable (1 if male, 0 female); 
SOCIAL : Social responsibilities dummy variable (1 if individual has social events, 0 
otherwise); 
SOH : Size of household; 
SREGION : Region dummy variable (1 if applicant lives in the southern region, 0 
otherwise); 
VMS : Value of monetary savings owned by the applicant (JDs); 
VOCOLL : Value of collateral available to secure the loan; 
WS : Working status (1 if employed, 0 unemployed ); 
YOFE : Number of years of formal education. 
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APPENDIX–II7 
 
Determinants of Applying for Micro Credit  
 
Variable Coefficient8  z-Statistic Prob. 
AGE24 0.284644*** 1.877522 0.0604 
AGE25_34 -0.065253 -1.179037 0.2384 
AGE35_44 0.359776* 4.367715 0.0000 
AGE45_54 -0.192114** -2.328510 0.0199 
AGE55_64 0.335122 1.330758 0.1833 
SEX   -0.901515** -2.138475 0.0325 
YOFE   -0.004577 -0.176568 0.8598 
WS   -1.511982* -4.192432 0.0000 
MSTATUS   1.216245** 2.125138 0.0336 
NTCFLOW   0.000560 0.556704 0.5777 
HOH   1.355231** 2.523998 0.0116 
POR  -0.400745 -1.363842 0.1726 
KNOW   1.169303* 3.855166 0.0001 
SOH 0.038175 0.748993 0.4539 
HVOMS (JDs) -0.000183** -2.370156 0.0178 
GCOLL   -1.834887* -4.291016 0.0000 
RECOLL   1.094587 1.583466 0.1133 
SOCIAL   -1.296156* -4.263278 0.0000 
RBFS   -2.500797* -6.525077 0.0000 
APPCOST -7.266436*** -1.944897 0.0518 
AOLENDER  1.764559* 6.260354 0.0000 
MEDIATOR  -0.034670 -0.129554 0.8969 
EFFLOANS   1.788735* 5.456716 0.0000 
Observation N = 474                             Log Likelihood = -87.99595                 Percentage Predicted 
Correctly = 91.77 
 
                                                 
7 Note that the EViews program refers to "t" statistics as "z" statistics, since they are valid only for large 
samples, and in large samples the differences between the "t" and the standard normal distribution are 
negligible. 
8 (*) significant at 1 percent level, (**) significant at 5 percent level, and (***) significant at 10 percent 
level.  
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APPENDIX–III 
 
Determinants of Demand for Micro Credit 
 
Variable Coefficient9 t-Statistic Prob. 
CONSTANT 2.251893 0.002729 0.9978 
BANKLOAN 0.093386** 2.543308 0.0117 
INFLOAN 0.216586 0.749228 0.4546 
IR 642.1204 0.147317 0.8830 
ASSETS 0.014827** 2.488023 0.0137 
VOCOLL 0.090685* 3.029262 0.0028 
ME   531.9168** 2.016417 0.0451 
SOCIAL   559.6287* 2.623666 0.0094 
SREGION   -501.0598 -1.470624 0.1430 
AGRI   1318.268* 3.014950 0.0029 
SER   -890.0586* -3.054981 0.0026 
POR   -707.1682* -3.270646 0.0013 
AGE   -13.08633 -0.991128 0.3228 
SEX   -86.39930 -0.328125 0.7432 
YOFE   57.51705** 2.542878 0.0118 
HOH   1004.417** 2.123317 0.0350 
MSTATUS   1326.438*** 2.759892 0.0063 
IMR 666.2947 1.578903 0.1160 
R-squared  = 0.327112                         F-value      = 5.661997* 
 
                                                 
9 (*) significant at 1 percent level, (**) significant at 5 percent level, and (***) significant at 10 percent 
level. 
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APPENDIX–IV 
 
Determinants of Being Credit Constrained in Micro Credit Market 
 
Variable Coefficient10 z-Statistic Prob. 
AGE -0.232218* -5.259675 0.0000 
AGESQ 0.002746* 4.890399 0.0000 
SEX   -0.110548 -0.404703 0.6857 
MSTATUS   0.035596 0.074968 0.9402 
YOFE   0.021065 0.996117 0.3192 
NTCFLOW 0.001031 1.423996 0.1544 
HOH   1.080022** 2.119697 0.0340 
WS   -0.179190 -0.725309 0.4683 
CREGION   0.339963 0.948242 0.3430 
NREGION   0.757048** 1.994121 0.0461 
DEP 0.180067** 3.194027 0.0014 
HVOMS -0.000165*** -1.799149 0.0720 
VOCOLL -0.000107** -2.439380 0.0147 
APPREJ 2.250638* 9.762352 0.0000 
LEVERFORMAL 0.063998* 3.040860 0.0024 
LEVERMFIS 0.026893** 2.023739 0.0430 
LEVERINFORMAL 0.020677 0.950534 0.3418 
SOCIAL   0.569366** 2.534941 0.0112 
POLOAN   0.558345** 2.404850 0.0162 
POR   -0.866660* -4.033283 0.0001 
VMS 6.63E-05 1.462924 0.1435 
MEDIATOR   1.301714* 4.522751 0.0000 
AGRI   1.293975** 2.494547 0.0126 
Observation N = 474                            Log likelihood = -115.1187                    Percentage predicted 
correctly = 92.1 
 
                                                 
10  (*) significant at 1 percent level, (**) significant at 5 percent level, and (***) significant at 10 percent 
level. 
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APPENDIX–V 
 
Determinants of Supply of Micro Credit 
 
variables Coefficient11 z-Statistic Prob. 
CONSTANT -1958.926* -3.461173 0.0005 
IR 19795.73* 9.267082 0.0000 
ASSETS 0.003883*** 1.677388 0.0935 
VOCOLL 0.016759 1.628314 0.1035 
ME   172.9685*** 1.811962 0.0700 
EFFLOAN    198.4135** 2.391540 0.0168 
SOCIAL   -77.24294 -0.924811 0.3551 
EXPER   30.55691* 3.420067 0.0006 
MAT  ) 40.25886* 22.79978 0.0000 
DEP 18.18662 0.801819 0.4227 
SREGION   -10.23964 -0.080097 0.9362 
AGRI   -157.1158 -0.965540 0.3343 
SER  ) 79.60072 0.753414 0.4512 
POR   -378.8748* -4.593056 0.0000 
AGE   58.79752** 2.306142 0.0211 
AGESQ -0.796496* -2.591962 0.0095 
SEX  ) -129.4854 -1.320018 0.1868 
YOFE   5.213223 0.575922 0.5647 
HOH   -215.7328*** -1.732806 0.0831 
IMR 80.69546 0.774890 0.4384 
Observation (N) = 216                          Left Censored  = 78                           R-squared  =  0.937954 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 (*) significant at 1 percent level, (**) significant at 5 percent level, and (***) significant at 10 percent 
level. 
 
